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Abstract 
 
The point of our work is to assess security dangers in Bluetooth-empowered 
frameworks.   Our  exploration  work focuses on handy  parts  of Bluetooth  security. 
It  can  be generally  isolated  into  four sections.   First  and  foremost,  shortcomings 
of Bluetooth  security  are  mulled  over taking  into  account  a  writing  survey,  and 
a Bluetooth  security research center environment for actualizing Bluetooth  security 
assaults by and by has been manufactured. Also, distinctive  sorts of assaults against 
Bluetooth  security  are  researched  and  the  possibility  of some of them  are  shown 
in our exploration  lab.  Countermeasures against  every sort  of assault  are likewise 
proposed.  Thirdly,  a portion of the current Bluetooth  security assaults are upgraded 
and new assaults  are proposed.  To do these assaults  by and by, Bluetooth  security 
investigation  devices are executed.   Countermeasures that  render these assaults 
unreasonable  are  likewise proposed.    At long last,  a  relative  examination  of the 
current Man-In-The-Middle assaults  on Bluetooth  is displayed,  a novel framework 
for distinguishing  and  forestalling interruptions in Bluetooth  systems  is proposed, 
and a further  arrangement of Bluetooth-empowered specially appointed  systems is 
given.
5  
oduction 1 
Bluetooth  versions   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     2 
1.1.1 First  Version    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
1.1.2 Further Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
1.1.3 New Version .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
 
 
 
 
 
Certificate                                                                                                       ii 
Acknowledgement  iii                                                                                              
Abstract                                                                                                    iv 
List of Figures                                                                                              vi 
1   Intr 
1.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2   Bluetooth  communication    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     5 
1.3   Special characteristics of the Bluetooth  medium   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     6 
1.3.1    Protocols    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     8 
 
 
2   Litreture  Survey                                                                                    12 
2.1   Cryptography  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   12 
 
2.2 Analysis of existing schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
 2.2.1    Security   .  .  .  .  .  .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
2.3 Connections  in Bluetooth     . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
 2.3.1    Protocol  Specification:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
 
3 Proposed Scheme                       16 
 3.1   Diffie-Hellman Protocol .  .  .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
 3.2   Bluetooth  security architecture  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
6  
Implementation Of  Proposed Scheme 21 
4.1 Details regarding implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
4.2 IrMC .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
4.3 RFCOMM  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
4.4 Bluetooth  Application  Profiles Using OBE X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
4.5 Modules  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
 4.5.1    Bluetooth  Connectivity(Pairing) .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
 4.5.2    Bluetooth  Key Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
 4.5.3    Bluetooth  Data  Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
4.6 Screen shots  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
 
                       32 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.1    Authentication   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   18 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Results and Observations                          31 
 5.1   Security Analysis   .  .  .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
 5.2   Performance  Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
 
6   Future  Scope and Conclusion 
 
 
Bibliography                                                                                                  33 
 
 
                                                                                              
vii  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of Figures 
 
 
 
 
1.1 a)  Bluetooth   topology  when  ACL  links  are  used.    b)  Bluetooth 
topology when SCO or eSCO links are used.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     6 
1.2   range of bluetooth  devices  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     7 
 
1.3   Bluetooth  protocol stack. .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     8 
 
 
4.1   Synchronisation  Application   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   23 
 
4.2   Comparing  pairing codes between two devices.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   26 
 
4.3   Determining  their inequalities  and unifying these two object stores .  .   27 
 
4.4   Synchronization  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   28 
 
4.5   File Transfer  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   28 
 
4.6   Sending generic files   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   29 
 
4.7   Retrieving  generic files from Bluetooth  Devices .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   29 
 
4.8   Bearing objects and optionally pulling the default objects .  .  .  .  .  .  .   30
1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter  1 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Bluetooth[5]  is an innovation  for short range remote information and realtime two-
way voice exchange giving information  rates  up to 3 Mb/s.   It can be utilized  to 
unite any gadget  to another  gadget.   Bluetooth[5]-empowered  gadgets,  for example,  
cell telephones,  headsets,  PCs, portable  PCs, printers,  mice, and consoles, are 
generally utilized  everywhere  throughout the  world.   As of now in 2006, the  one 
billionth Bluetooth  gadget  was sent,  and  the  volume  is relied  upon  to  increment 
quickly soon. The objective volume for 2010 is as high as two billion Bluetooth[5] 
gadgets. Hence, it is imperative  to stay up with the latest.  As an interconnection 
innovation, Bluetooth[5] needs to address all conventional  security issues, no doubt  
understood from conveyed systems.   Likewise, security  issues in remote  adhoc  
systems  are  a great  deal more intricate  than  those of more customary  wired or 
brought together remote  systems.   Besides,  Bluetooth[5]  systems  are  shaped  by 
radio  connections, which  implies  that   there  are  extra  security  viewpoints  whose  
effect  is  not  yet surely  knew.   The  L2CAP[2] (Logical Link  Control  and  
Adaptation Protocol)  is a product  module that  typically  lives on the  host.   The  
ACL[1] connection  gives a parcel  exchanged  association  between  the  expert  and  
all dynamic  slaves in the piconet.  Diffie-Hellman key[6] trade  is taking into account 
the utilization  of discrete logarithm.    The  L2CAP[2] (Logical  Link  Control  and  
Adaptation Protocol)  is a product  module that  typically  lives on the  host.   The  
ACL[1] connection  gives a
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bundle  exchanged  association  between  the  expert  and  all  dynamic  slaves in  the 
piconet.  Diffie-Hellman key[6] trade is in view of the utilization  of discrete logarithm 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1     Bluetooth versions 
 
 
The  preparatory  work  for  creating   Bluetooth[5]   innovation   began  in  1994,  
when Ericsson  started exploring  the  conceivable  methods  for supplanting   links  
in  the middle of adornments  and  portable  telephones  with remote  connections.   
Ericsson immediately understood  the potential  business for Bluetooth  items, yet 
overall collaboration was required for the items to succeed. Along these lines, the 
Bluetooth SIG  [Blu07b] was  established  in  February   1998 by  Ericsson,  Nokia,  
IBM,  Intel and  Toshiba.    3Com,  Lucent,  Microsoft  and  Motorola  joined  the  
Bluetooth  SIG in December 1999.These nine individuals  from the Bluetooth  SIG 
are known as the Bluetooth  SIG Promoters. They are in charge of upper-level SIG 
organization,  and for giving labor to run the advertising,  capability  and lawful 
procedures.  At present, the Bluetooth  SIG has more than  10000 part  organizations. 
 
 
1.1.1   First Version 
 
The primary open adaptation of Bluetooth[5]  particular, Bluetooth  1.0A [Blu99a], 
was discharged in July 1999. Numerous gadget producers experienced issues in 
making their  Bluetooth  1.0A good items interoperable.  Consequently,  the  
Bluetooth  1.0B particular [Blu99b] was discharged later around  the same time 
(December 1999) to alter the interoperability issues. The Bluetooth  1.1 particular 
[Blu01] was discharged in February  2001.  It altered  numerous  mistakes  that  were 
found in the  Bluetooth 
1.0B particular and included backing for decoded correspondence  and additionally 
bolster  for RSSI (Received Signal Strength  Indicator).RSSI is an estimation  of the 
got radio sign quality  that  is utilized  for controlling  power as a part  of Bluetooth 
gadgets.  It can likewise be utilized for Bluetooth  situating  purposes, for instance.
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The Bluetooth 1.2 specification [Blu03] was launced in November 2003. It included 
major modifications such as: [Blu03] 
 
• AFH  (Adaptive  Frequency   Hopping):    AFH  further   modifies  the  original 
Bluetooth frequency hopping method FHSS (Frequency Hopping Spread 
Spectrum)  by ignoring the  use of channels  that  suffer from interference.   A 
maximum  of 59 ”bad”  channels can be turned  off during the communication 
session,  i.e.    only  20  different  ”good”  channels  are  essential.     AFH  too 
serves higher  transmission  speeds in practice  by decreasing  the  demand  for 
retransmissions. 
 
• eSCO (extended Synchronous Connection-Oriented): eSCO modifies the voice 
quality  of Bluetooth   audio  links  by  allowing  retransmissions   of corrupted 
packets. 
 
• Optional  QoS (Quality-of-Service)  improvements : QoS improvements  further 
improve the scope for error detection,  flow controlling and synchronization. 
 
 
1.1.2   Further  Version 
 
The  Bluetooth   2.0+EDR  (Enhanced   Data   Rate)   determination  [Blu04a] was 
discharged  in November  2004.   The  fundamental  change  was the  presentation of 
EDR, which gives information  rates up to 3 Mb/s.  The first Bluetooth  information 
rate before EDR was 1 Mb/s.  As per the Bluetooth  SIG, EDR has the accompanying 
impacts  on Bluetooth  correspondence:  [Blu04a,Blu04b] 
 
• Three times better  transmission  speed (up to 10 times in certain  cases). 
 
 
• Lower power consumption  by a reduced duty  cycle. 
 
 
• Simplification of multilink  scenarios due to more present bandwidth 
 
 
• Further improved BER (Bit-Error-Rate) performance.
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1.1.3   New Version 
 
New Bluetooth   forms  are  in  reverse  perfect  with  the  more  seasoned  variants. 
The  most  recent open rendition  of Bluetooth  determination, Bluetooth  2.1+EDR 
[Blu07a], was discharged  in July  2007.  It  gives numerous  upgrades,  for example, 
[Blu07a] 
 
• Encryption Pause Resume:  Encryption  Pause Resume will further upgrade 
security by permitting  scrambled connections to change their encryption  keys 
intermittently. Expert  slave role switches (Section 2.2 clarifies the expert slave 
relationship) will likewise be conceivable on an encoded connection. 
 
• Extended  Inquiry  Response:  Extended  Inquiry  Response will give more 
data,  for example, the name of the gadget and a rundown of bolstered 
administrations, amid  the  request  method,  permitting better  gadget  sifting 
before the association is built up. 
 
• SSP: SSP  fundamentally enhances  the  Bluetooth  matching  background  by 
simplifying the blending procedure from the client’s perspective.  It will likewise 
expand the quality  of security by giving the assurance  against both  detached 
listening  in  assaults  and  MITM  assaults  (dynamic  spying  assaults).     The 
Bluetooth  SIG expects that  this highlight will essentially build the utilization 
of Bluetooth  innovation. 
 
• NFC (Near Field Communication) [NFC08] as an OOB (Out-Of-Band) 
channel:  In order to give assurance against MITM assaults, SSP either utilizes 
NFC  as  an  OOB  channel  or  requests  that   the  client look at  two six-digit 
numbers.  Such a correlation  can also be thought as an OOB channel which is 
not controlled by the MITM. However,when NFC radio interface is accessible, 
SSP bolsters the programmed  formation  of secure Bluetooth  associations. 
 
• Sniff  Subrating:  Sniff Subrating  will further  lessen the  force utilization  of 
 
Bluetooth  gadgets.  For instance,  it will build the battery life of HID (Human
5 
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Interface  Devices) gadgets,  for example, mice and consoles, by 3 to 10 times 
contrasted and the battery life times of more seasoned Bluetooth  HID gadgets. 
 
 
 
1.2     Bluetooth communication 
 
 
Connection    sorts    define   the    ways   Bluetooth    devices   can   exchange   data. 
Bluetooth  has three  connection sorts:  ACL[1] (Asynchronous  Connection-Less),  
SCO[1] (Synchronous  Connection-Oriented) and eSCO. 
 
1. SCO connections  are symmetric  (greatest  of 64 kb/s  for both  headings)  and 
are utilized  for transferring  realtime  two-way voice.  Retransmission of voice 
bundles is not utilized.  Accordingly, when the channel BER is high, voice can 
be twisted. 
 
2. eSCO connections  are  likewise symmetric  (most  extreme  of 864 kb/s   for 
both headings) and are utilized for exchanging realtime two-way voice. 
Retransmission of bundles is utilized to guarantee  the trustworthiness of 
information   (voice).      Since  retransmission   of  parcels   is  utilized,   eSCO 
connections  can likewise convey information  bundles.   Then  again,  they  are 
basically  utilized  for exchanging  realtime  two-way voice.   Bluetooth  1.2 (or 
later)  gadgets  can utilize  eSCO joins, yet  they  should  likewise bolster  SCO 
connections to provide backward-similarity. 
 
 
ACL  connections  are  for  symmetric   (greatest   of  1306.9  kb/s   for  both 
bearings)  or unbalanced  (greatest  of 2178.1 kb/s  for send and 177.1 kb/s  for 
get) information  exchange.  Retransmission of parcels is utilized to guarantee 
the honesty of information.
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Figure 1.1: a) Bluetooth  topology when ACL links are used.  b) Bluetooth  topology 
when SCO or eSCO links are used. 
 
1.3     Special characteristics   of  the  Bluetooth 
medium 
 
Bluetooth  is a remote RF correspondence framework utilizing chiefly 
omnidirectional antennas.Communication with other Bluetooth gadgets is 
conceivable inside of the reach, and no direct lineof-sight between the imparting 
Bluetooth  gadgets is needed.  This capacity  makes Bluetooth  correspondence 
much simpler to use than  the conventional  link based correspondence or short 
range direct viewable pathway  infrared correspondence, however then again it 
too makes spying much less demanding.Bluetooth devices can create  ad-hoc 
networks of several devices in which no fixed infrastructure is required. 
 
 
There are three  Bluetooth  gadget classes: class 1, class 2 and class 3.  The 
greatest  transmit powers for class 1, class 2 and class 3 gadgets are 100 mW 
(20 dBm, i.e.  20 decibels relative  to one milliwatt),  2.5 mW (4 dBm),  and 1 
mW (0 dBm) individually.  As indicated  by the Bluetooth  particular [Blu07a], 
the reference affectability  level of a Bluetooth  gadget needs to be -70 dBm or
7 
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Figure 1.2: range of bluetooth  devices 
 
 
better. 
 
 
 
The scope of Bluetooth[5]  gadgets relies on upon the class of gadgets at 
both closures, the affectability levels at both closures, and the level of 
obstructions. The amount n is the supposed PL (Path Loss) example that  can 
be conformed to record for the measure of disarray  in the way between the 
transmitter and the beneficiary.  The level of hindrances  can be generally 
separated  into four classifications:  none (a free space without  disarray  in the  
transmit-get way; n=2.0),   light (a  gently  jumbled  way,  for example,  an  
office situation   with moveable dividers; n=2.5),  moderate  (a reasonably 
jumbled way, for example, an office domain with altered  dividers; n=3.0),  or 
overwhelming (a vigorously jumbled  way in which the thickness  of the 
materials  utilized as a part  of the building’s development is high; n=4.0).
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Figure 1.3: Bluetooth  protocol stack. 
 
 
1.3.1   Protocols 
 
 
• Protocols beneath the HCI (Host Controller Interface)are assembled 
into the Bluetooth  microchip, and conventions over the HCI are situated 
as a piece of the host gadget’s product bundle.  A HCI is required between 
the equipment and programming  conventions.  The reason for the HCI is 
to empower the maker autonomous consolidating of Bluetooth chips (Host 
Controller)  and  the  genuine host  gadget.   The  HCI deals with  security 
correspondence between the host and the Bluetooth  module. 
 
• Baseband  and LMP (Link Manager Protocol)together empower the 
physical  RF  connection.The   LC  (Link  Controller)   is  a  state  machine 
that   characterizes  the  current condition  of the  Bluetooth   gadget.    A 
Bluetooth  gadget can be in low-control mode for sparing batteries,  in the
9 
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associated state  for ordinary piconet operation,  or in the paging state  for 
the expert to convey new slaves to the piconet, for instance.  The LC has 
a pseudorandom  number  era  ability,  techniques  for overseeing security 
keys,  and  the  capacity  for giving the  scientific operations  expected  to 
verification and encryption. 
• The  LM   (Link Manager)acts as  a  contact  between  the  application 
and  the  LC  on the  neighborhood  gadget,  and  it  likewise speaks  with 
the  remote  LM by means  of PDUs  (Protocol  Data  Units)  utilizing  the 
LMP,  i.e.   the  LM corresponds  with  three  unique  substances  amid  a 
Bluetooth  session:  the  nearby  host through  the  HCI, the  neighborhood 
LC (nearby operations),  and the remote LM (join arrangement, join data, 
and connection administration operations).  The PDU is recognized at the 
Baseband  level, yet  it is followed up on by the  LM. The  neighborhood 
LM ordinarily  lives on the Bluetooth  module as a complete host-module 
execution.   The  remote  LM can be characterized  as the  LM at  the  flip 
side of the Bluetooth  join.  The LM additionally  has a few summons for 
taking  care of security issues. [Blu07a, Mor02] 
• SCO[1]and eSCO[1]links are   utilized   for  exchanging   realtime   
two-way voice.They   are   built   up   specifically  from   the   Baseband   
level,   so the overhead of upper layer conventions does not bring about  
any postponements  for  realtime  two-way  voice  associations.     Four  
parcel sorts  have been characterized  for SCO joins, though  eSCO 
connections bolster  seven bundle  sorts  [Blu07a].  One of these 11 parcel 
sorts,  SCO join’s HV1 (High-quality  Voice 1), is truly  fascinating  from 
the security perspective,  in  light of the  fact  that   one single HV1 SCO  
connection holds all Bluetooth  piconet assets and subsequently  makes 
different DoS (Denial-of-Service) assaults  conceivable. 
• TheL2CAP[2] (Logical Link Control and Adaptation  
Protocol)is a  product   module  that   ordinarily   lives  on  the  host.     
It  fits  upper
10 
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layer  conventions  to  the  Baseband,  i.e.  it  goes about  as a channel  for 
information on the ACL connection between the Baseband and host 
applications.   The L2CAP[2] additionally  offers CO (Connection-
Oriented; from expert to one slave and from slave to ace) and CL 
(Connection-Less; from expert  to different  slaves) administrations, and  
it  is characterized just  for ACL joins.   Lower layer  conventions  don’t  
need  to  know how layers over the L2CAP[2] work and viceversa.  The 
L2CAP[2] can start  security systems when a CO or a CL channel 
association endeavor is made. 
• The   SDP  (Service  Discovery  Protocol)is  used  to  discover  the 
administrations of Bluetooth  gadgets  in the  range.RFCOMM (Radio 
Frequency  Communication)emulates serial  ports  over  the  L2CAP, 
what’s more, along these lines it is conceivable to utilize existing serial 
port applications  through  Bluetooth. 
• The  OBEX (Ob ject Exchange Protocol)is  used to trade  items,  for 
example,  schedule  notes,  business  cards  and  information   documents, 
between gadgets by utilizing the customer server model.  The OBEX 
underpins six straightforward and obvious operations:  Connect (pick your 
accomplice, arrange capacities and build up association), Disconnect (end 
association), Put (push articles to the server), Get (draw objects from the 
server),  (prematurely end an article  trade  that  is in advancement), and 
SetPath (set server’s index way to another  worth). 
• The  TCS  (Telephony  Control  convention  Specification)binary 
characterizes   the   call  control   flagging  for  the   foundation/arrival  of 
discourse and information  calls between Bluetooth  gadgets.  It too gives 
usefulness to trading  flagging data  that  is irrelevant to continuous  calls. 
Numerous  AT  orders  are  additionally  upheld  for transmitting control 
signals for telephony  control. 
• The  BNEP (Bluetooth Network Encapsulation Protocol)is  used 
to give organizing abilities for Bluetooth  gadgets.  It permits IP (Internet
11 
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Protocol)  parcels to be conveyed in the payload of L2CAP bundles.  The 
IP  is a system  layer  convention  in the  TCP/IP (Transmission  Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol) convention suite.   TCP and UDP (User 
Datagram Protocol)  are transport layer center  conventions  utilized  as a 
part  of the TCP/IP convention  suite.  PPP (Point-to-Point Convention) 
can likewise be utilized to give TCP/IP organizing abilities for Bluetooth 
gadgets,yet,  it is slower, i.e. it meets expectations  over RFCOMM  while 
BNEP lives up to expectations  straightforwardly over the L2CAP,what’s 
more, along these lines PPP is once in a while utilized at this point.
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Chapter  2 
 
 
 
 
Litreture Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1     Cryptography 
 
The primary  ideas of the general population  key encryption  plan are:: 
(a)  Plaintext :  The  plaintext   is the  initial  understandable message  or 
 
information  sustained  into the encryption  algorithm  as input. 
 
(b)  Encryption  algorithm :  The encryption  algorithm  performs different 
changes on the plaintext 
(c)  Public key : The public key is required for encryption. 
(d) Private  key : The private  key is essential for decryption. 
(e)  Cipher text : The ciphertext  is a scrambled  message produced  as an 
output that  takes into account the plaintext  and the public key. 
(f )  Decryption   algorithm :     The   decryption    algorithm   receives   the 
ciphertext   and  the  matching   private   key,  and  gives  the  original 
plaintext.
13 
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2.2     Analysis of existing schemes 
 
 
Diffie-Hellman key[6] exchange relies on the use of discrete logarithm. 
Pick  a prime  p and  a number  g¡p, which is a primitive  base of p.   We 
know numbers p and g are public. 
 
(a)  User A chooses the private  key SA  < p and calculates the public key 
 
SA 
 
JA = g
SA modp. Hence, the whole public key of user A is (p, g, JA ). 
(b)  The public key is used for sharing a common secret key by the given 
way: 
 
–  User A sends the public key (p,g,JA ) to user B and user B sends 
 
(p,g,JB ) to user A too.
 
–  User  A computes  J SA 
 
=  gSB SA ,  and  user  B computes  J 
SB   =
 
gSA SB  too. 
 
–  gSA SB    is  their  common  secret  key  (to  be  used  for  symmetric 
encryption),  that is difficult for outsiders  to invent,  even if they 
know p, g, JA and JB . 
 
 
2.2.1   Security 
 
 
The  security  of a symmetric  cryptosystem  relies on upon two  things: 
the  quality  of the  calculation  and  the  length  of the  key.  There  are two 
general methodologies for assaulting  a symmetric  encryption  plan: 
 
–  Cryptanalysis:  Cryptanalytic  assaults  depend  on  the way  of the 
calculation  and  maybe  some  learning  of  the  general  qualities  of 
plaintext  or even some example plaintext-ciphertext sets.    The 
fundamental   point is to  adventure   the  qualities  of the  calculation 
trying to find a particular plaintext  or to reason the key being utilized. 
On the off chance that  the key (or even a piece of the key) is found,
14 
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all future and past  messages encoded with that  key are traded  off. 
 
–  Brute force attack:  An assailant tries each conceivable key esteem on 
a bit of ciphertext  until a comprehensible interpretation into plaintext 
is acquired.  All things  considered, 50conceivable key qualities  must 
be attempted to make progress. 
 
 
 
2.3     Connections in  Bluetooth 
 
 
Connections  sorts  characterize  the  ways Bluetooth  gadgets  can trade 
information.  Bluetooth[5] has three connection sorts: 
 
(a) ACL[1]    (Asynchronous-Connection-Less),     SCO    (Synchronous- 
Connection-Oriented) and eSCO. SCO connection is utilized to 
exchange of constant administrations (mostly voice application). 
(b)  ACL[1]   connection   is   expected   for   exchanging   of  
nonconcurrent activity  (information  application,  for example,  
document exchange, astounding  sound/feature exchange etc. 
(c)  Bluetooth  Baseband  convention  bolsters  both  SCO connection  and 
ACL connection, while Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol 
(L2CAP[2])  just bolster ACL join. 
(d) All the Bluetooth  ACL information applications  or higher layer 
conventions use L2CAP[2] to correspond with the Baseband. 
 
 
The essential part  of the L2CAP[2] layer is to shroud the normal 
for the  lower layer transport conventions  from the  higher layers in 
the convention stack.
15 
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2.3.1   Protocol Specification: 
 
 
Logical  Link  Control   and   Adaptation  protocol   (L2CAP)[2]   is  
layered over the  Baseband  Protocol  and  dwells in  the  information  
connection layer.   The convention gives association situated  and 
connectionless information administrations to upper layer conventions.  
Useful necessities for L2CAP[2]  are  convention  multiplexing,  division  
and  reassembly,  and gathering  management.L2CAP[2] depiction  is 
taking  into account the idea of ’channels’.   Consistent channel  endpoint 
on the  gadget  is spoken to with channel identifier(C1D). 
 
 
Logical Link Control  and  Adaptation convention  (L2CAP)  is layered 
over the Baseband Protocol and lives in the information  connection layer. 
The convention gives association situated  and connectionless information 
administrations  to   upper   layer   conventions.      Utilitarian   necessities 
for L2CAP[2]  are  convention  multiplexing,  division  and  reassembly,  
and gathering   administration.L2CAP[2]  depiction  is  taking  into  
account  the idea  of ’channels’.Logical channel  endpoint on the gadget  
is spoken to with  channel  identifier.In  this  paper  we concentrate  on a 
setup  process for transaction of the channel parameters.  Setup  stage 
must  be entered preceding information trade, and may be re-entered if 
channel parameters need to be renegotiated  amid information  
transmission.
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Chapter  3 
 
 
 
 
Proposed Scheme 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1     Diffie-Hellman Protocol 
 
 
Diffie-Hellman[6] key exchange is based on the use of discrete 
logarithm. 
 
–  Choose a prime p and a number  g < p, which is a primitive  root of 
p. Numbers p and g are public. 
–  User A chooses the  private  key SA   < p and  computes  the  public 
key SA JA = g
SA modp.  Therefore,  the whole public key of user A is 
(p,g, JA ). 
–  The public key can be used for sharing  a common secret key in the 
following way: 
–  User A sends the  public  key (p,g,JA ) to  user  B and  user  B sends 
 
(p,g,JB ) to user A. 
 
–  User A computes J SA   = gSB SA , and user B computes J SB  = gSA SB   . B                                                                                        A 
 
 
gSA SB    is  their  common  secret  key  (to  be  used  for  symmetric 
encryption),  which is difficult for others to invent, even if they know 
p,g,JA and JB. .
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3.2     Bluetooth security architecture 
 
 
The different types of connectability  and discoverability  capabilities  can 
be split into three categories, or security levels: 
 
–  Silent : The device will not accept any connections.  It simply checks 
 
Bluetooth  traffic. 
 
–  Private :   The  device  can  never  be  discovered,   i.e.     it  is  hence 
so-called non-discoverable  device.  Connections  are accepted  only if 
the BDA DDR  (Bluetooth Device Address) of the device is known to 
the prospective master.  A 48-bit BDA DDR  is generally unique and 
refers as a whole to only one individual Bluetooth  device. 
–  Public: The device is both discoverable and connected to.  It is hence 
called a discoverable device. 
 
. 
 
There are also four different security modes that  a device can implement. 
In  Bluetooth  technology,  a device can  be in only one of the  following 
security modes at a time: 
 
–  Nonsecure :   The  Bluetooth   device  does  not  initiate   any  security 
measures. 
–  Service-level enforced  security  mode :   Two  Bluetooth   devices  can 
establish a nonsecure ACL link.    Security procedures, namely 
authentication, authorization and optional  encryption,  are initiated 
when an L2CAP CO or an L2CAP CL channel request  is made. 
–  Link-level enforced security  mode :  Security  procedures  are initiated 
when an ACL link is established. 
–  Service-level enforced security  mode:  This mode is similar to mode 
 
2, except that  only Bluetooth  devices using SSP can use it, i.e. only 
 
Bluetooth  2.1+EDR (or later)  devices can use this security mode.
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3.2.1   Authentication 
 
 
Authentication is used for supplying  the  identity  of one piconet  device 
to another.   The  output  of authentication are used for determining  the 
client’s authorization level, which can be implemented  in several distinct 
ways:   for  example,  access  can  be  granted   to  all  services,  only  to  a 
subset  of services, or to some services while other  services require extra 
authentication. Encryption  is utilized for encoding the information  being 
exchanged  between Bluetooth  devices in such a way that  eavesdroppers 
cannot decipher its contents.  Bluetooth  security is developed on building 
a chain of events,  none of which provides meaningful information  to an 
eavesdropper, and all events must occur in a distinct sequence for security 
to be created  successfully. Two Bluetooth  devices begin pairing with the 
same textitPIN (Personal  Identification  Number)  code that  is used for 
generating  several  128-bit  keys.   PIN  code selection,  for example  in a 
private  Bluetooth  network  environment,   i.e.when  a Bluetooth  network 
consists of various Bluetooth  devices such as a mobile phone, a printer, 
a DVD (Digital Versatile Disc; also known as Digital Video Disc) player, 
a  mouse  and  a  keyboard,  can  be  done  by  using  the  same  PIN  code 
for all Bluetooth  gadgets,  because the  user owns and  hence also trusts 
all  Bluetooth  devices that   are  used  in  his  private  Bluetooth  network. 
However,  each  master-slave   pair  can  have  a  distinct   PIN   code  for 
supplying trusted  relationship  between the devices. Therefore, PIN code 
selection, for example in a conference environment where two ”friends” 
meet and want to generate  a Bluetooth  network  between their  gadgets, 
should  be  done  by  using  a  distinct   PIN  code  for  each  master-slave 
pair, because otherwise all other Bluetooth  connections that  are utilizing 
the  same  PIN  code may  be compromised,  i.e.   it  is possible that   the 
”friend” will use the PIN code for eavesdropping or for attacking  purposes. 
SAFER+  with  a  128-bit  key  is  used  as  an  algorithm   for  Bluetooth
19 
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authorization and key generation. 
 
 
An initialization key (Kinit)  is generated when Bluetooth  devices unite 
for the  first  time  and  it  is used  for securing  the  generation  of other 
more secure 128-bit  keys,  which are  generated  during  the  next  phases 
of the  security  chain  of events.   The  Kinit  is generated  from a 128-bit 
pseudorandom  number I NRAN D , an L-byte PIN code, and a BDADDR . It 
is important that the I NRAN D   is sent through  air in unencrypted  form. 
The product  of a certain key generation  function can be defined in terms 
of the function itself and its inputs.  The Kinit is derived in both devices 
using the  formula Kinit=E22(PIN’,L’,I NRAN D ).  The  PIN  code and  its 
length  L are enhanced  into  two different quantities called PIN’ and  L’ 
before sending them to the E22 function.  If the PIN is less than  16 bytes, 
it is joined by appending bytes from the device?s BDADDR until the PIN’ 
either reaches a total  length of 16 bytes or the entire BDADDR is joined, 
whichever comes first.  If one gadget has a fixed PIN code, the BDADDR of 
the other gadget is used. If both gadgets can support a variable PIN code, 
the BDADDR of the gadget that  received the I NRAN D  is used.  The Kinit 
is used to encrypt a 128-bit pseudorandom  number (RAND or LKRAN D ), 
i.e.  RAND⊕Kinit  or LKRAN D ⊕ Kinit,  exchanged  in the  next  phase of 
the security chain of events where a link key (a unit key or a combination 
key) is created.  A unit key (KA) is generated from the information of only 
one device (device A) by using the formula A=E21(BDADDRA ,RANDA). 
Gadget  A encrypts  the KA with the Kinit,  i.e.  KA ⊕ Kinit,  and sends 
it to gadget  B. Gadget  B decrypts  the  KA with  the  Kinit,  i.e.  (KA ⊕ 
Kinit)  ⊕ Kinit=KA, and now both  gadgets have the same KA as a link 
key.  Only gadgets  that  have limited  resources, i.e.  no memory to store 
several keys, should utilize the KA, because it provides only lower level 
of security.  Therefore,  Bluetooth  specifications do not recommend using
20 
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KA. A combination key (KAB) is subordinate  on two devices and hence it 
is originated from the information of both gadgets.  The KAB is generated 
in  both  devices using  the  formula  KAB=E21(BDADDRA , LKRAN DA )⊕ 
E21(BDADDRB ,LKRAN DB ).   It is important that   generating  the  KAB 
is nothing  more than  a simple bitwise XOR between  two unit  keys, i.e. 
KAB=KA  ⊕ KB. Each  gadget can generate  its own unit  key and  each 
gadget  also has the  BDADDR  of the  other  gadget.   Hence, two gadgets 
have to exchange only their  respective  pseudorandom  numbers  in order 
to produce each other?s unit key. Gadget A encrypts the LKRAN DA  with 
the current key K, i.e. LKRAN DA ⊕ K where K can be the Kinit,  the KA 
or the KAB that  was created  earlier, and sends it to gadget B. The K is 
the Kinit if the gadgets create a link key for the first time together.  The 
K is the KA if the link key is being upgraded  to a combination  key, and 
it is the KAB if the link key is being changed.  ZGadget  B decrypts  the 
LKRAN DA   with the K, i.e.  (LKRAN DA  ⊕ K ) ⊕ K = LKRAN DA , and can 
now generate the KA. Accordingly, gadget B encrypts the LKRAN DB   with 
the K, i.e. LKRAN DB ⊕ K, and sends it to gadget A. Gadget  A decrypts 
the  LKRAN DB    with  the  K,  i.e.   (LKRAN DB   ⊕ K ) ⊕ K  = LKRAN DB , 
and  produces  the  KB. Finally,  both  gadgets  can generate  the  KAB by 
XORing the KA with the KB, i.e.  K AB = K A ⊕ K B.  The next phase 
of the  security  chain  of events  is the  challenge-response  authentication 
in which a claimant’s  memory  of a secret  link key is verified.   During 
each  authentication, a new 128-bit  pseudorandom  number  AURAN D   is 
exchanged through air in unencrypted  format.   Other inputs to the 
authorization  function  E1  are  the  BDADDR   of the  claimant  and  the 
current link key (KA or KAB).
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Chapter  4 
 
 
 
 
Implementation Of  Proposed 
 
 
Scheme 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1     Details regarding implementation 
 
 
32feet.NET  is also known as InTheHand 
 
(a)  Makes a direct data  connection. 
i.  Adds Virtual  Serial Port 
(b)  Does an OBEX transfer. 
 
(c)  Has the Bluetooth  stack and/or the OS connect to and use a remote 
service. 
(d)  Makes a direct data  connection using the L2CAP protocol. 
(e)  Checks whether  a particular device is in range. 
 
 
OBEX  utilizes  a  client-server   model  and  is  free  of  the  transport 
mechanism and transport API. 
 
 
A   Bluetooth[5]    empowered   device   needing   to   set   up   an   
OBEX communication  session with  another  device is thought to  be 
the  client
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device. 
 
 
 
The OBEX protocol also characterizes  a folder-listing object, which is 
used to browse the  contents  of folders on remote  gadget.   RFCOMM  is 
used as the fundamental  transport layer for OBEX. 
 
 
OBEX empowers applications  to work over the  Bluetooth  technology 
protocol stack as well as the IrDA stack. 
 
 
For Bluetooth  empowered gadgets,  only connection-oriented OBEX is 
supported.   Three  application  profiles have been produced  using OBEX 
which incorporate  SYNC, FTP  and OPP. 
 
 
There are two sorts of OBEX operations:  a PUT and a GET. The PUT 
operation  is to send an article  from the  customer  to the  server and the 
GET operation  is to give back an item from the server to the customer. 
 
 
 
4.2     IrMC 
 
 
IrMC Server  The gadget that provides an object exchange server. 
Typically, this gadget is a mobile phone or PDA. 
 
 
IrMC Client  The gadget which contains  a sync engine and pulls and 
pushes the  PIM  data  from and to the  IrMC Server.  Usually, the  IrMC 
Client device is a PC 
 
 
 
4.3     RFCOMM 
 
 
The  RFCOMM  protocol  emulates  the  serial  cable  line  settings  and 
status   of an  RS-232 serial  port  and  is used  for providing  serial  data
23 
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Figure 4.1: Synchronisation  Application
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transfer.  RFCOMM connects to the lower layers of the Bluetooth protocol 
stack through  the L2CAP layer. 
 
 
 
4.4     Bluetooth  Application  Profiles  Using 
 
OBEX 
 
 
–  Synchronization:Basically,  the  synchronization  means  comparing 
two object stores, deciding their  differences, and then  binding these 
two object stores. 
–  File  Transfer:At the least, the File Transfer  profile is intended  for 
sending and retrieving generic files to and from the Bluetooth  gadget. 
–  Ob ject Push:The Object  Push  profile is the extraordinary case of 
the File Transfer Profile for bearing objects and alternatively pulling 
the default objects 
 
 
 
4.5     Modules 
 
 
4.5.1   Bluetooth Connectivity(Pairing) 
 
 
The RFCOMM protocol copies the serial cable line settings and status 
of an  RS-232 serial port  and  is used for providing  serial data  transfer. 
RFCOMM joins the lower layers of the Bluetooth  protocol stack through 
the L2CAP layer. 
 
 
4.5.2   Bluetooth Key Authentication 
 
 
Basically,  the  synchronization   means  contrasting two  object  stores, 
determining  their differences, and then  binding these two object stores.
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4.5.3   Bluetooth Data Transmission 
 
 
There are two sorts of OBEX operations:  a PUT and a GET. The PUT 
operation  is to send an article  from the  customer  to the  server and the 
GET operation  is to give back an item from the server to the customer. 
 
 
 
4.6     Screen shots
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Figure 4.2: Comparing  pairing codes between two devices.
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Figure 4.3: Determining  their inequalities  and unifying these two object stores
28 
Chapter  4 Implementation Of Proposed Scheme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Synchronization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: File Transfer
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Figure 4.6: Sending generic files 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Retrieving  generic files from Bluetooth  Devices
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Figure 4.8: Bearing objects and optionally pulling the default objects
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Chapter  5 
 
 
 
 
Future  Scope and Conclusion 
 
 
 
To   better   understand  the   total   impact   of  Bluetooth   on   future 
pervasive  computing  applications  (e.g.,  performance,  reaction  to  noise, 
and interferences in a piconet or scatternets), 
 
To create Bluetooth  Transmission  safer 
 
5.1     Security Analysis 
 
 
Due   to   inclusion   of   Authentication   mechanism,    the   improved 
Diffie-Hellman[6] Key  exchange  protocol  can  stand  up  to  replay  
attack, impersonation   attack   and  man-in-the-middle  attack.     The  
simulation outputs  in the  LAN prove that  authentication using hash  
function  has the  fewer computing  quantity and the  faster  computing  
speed than  the other  public key and symmetric  key encryption  
algorithm.  It has a high practical  worth in creating a secure 
communication  channel of symmetric key. 
 
 
 
5.2     Performance Evaluation 
 
As long as the Diffie-Hellman[6] problem is difficult to decode, no 
eavesdropper can make out the secret key from the publicly known 
intelligence.
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